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Abstract
This article will survey decisions of the Florida Supreme
Court during 1985 which dealt with substantive criminal law issues
in three important areas: (1) criminal offenses, (2) lesser included
and multiple offenses, and (3) defenses to crimes.
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This article will survey decisions of the Florida Supreme
Court during 1985 which dealt with substantive criminal law is-
sues in three important areas: (1) criminal offenses, (2) lesser in-
cluded and multiple offenses, and (3) defenses to crimes. Obvi-
ously, all cases addressing substantive criminal law issues are not
included. Those that are included represent certain important
(though sometimes quite narrow) changes in Florida's substantive
criminal law, or are representative of the Florida Supreme
Court's focus and direction with regard to the issue considered.
I. Criminal Offenses
(1) Escape. In State v. Ramsey,' the court addressed the issue of
whether Florida Statute section 944.402 is violated when an arrested
but unhandcuffed suspect escapes a police officer before being placed in
the police car. The Fifth District Court of Appeal had reversed Ram-
sey's conviction,3 concluding that in order to come within the statute
the escape must occur while the prisoner is being transported. In
quashing the district court of appeal decision, the supreme court ap-
* I extend my thanks to Stephen D. Hurm, a third-year student at Stetson, for
his assistance with this article.
** Professor of Law, Stetson University; B.A., 1953, Vanderbilt; J.D., 1967
George Washington College.
1. 475 So. 2d 671 (Fla. 1985). State v. Iafornaro, 475 So. 2d 209 (Fla. 1985), a
case presenting the same issue, was decided by the court about six weeks later, with the
same result.
2. FLA. STAT. § 944.40 (1981) provides:
Any prisoner confined in any prison, jail, road camp, or other penal institu-
tion, state, county, or municipal, working upon the public roads, or being
transported to or from a place of confinement who escapes or attempts to
escape from such confinement shall be guilty of a felony of the second
degree, punishable as provided in § 775.082, § 775.083, or § 775.084. The
punishment of imprisonment imposed under this section shall run consecu-
tive to any former sentence imposed upon any prisoner.
3. Ramsey v. State, 442 So. 2d 303 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
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proved the holding of State v. Akers,4 from the Second District Court
of Appeal, which was in conflict. Akers held that to come within the
escape statute the state need show only (1) the right to legal custody
and (2) a conscious and intentional act of the defendant in leaving the
established area of such custody.5
The court went on to address the meaning of the words "being
transported to or from a place of confinement" as found in the statute.
In this regard the court noted that one who meets the definition of
"prisoner," as found in Florida Statute section 944.02(5),6 is at the
time he becomes a prisoner "being transported to a place of confine-
ment." As if to underscore the resoluteness of its decision, the court
held that even if the words of the statute did not lend themselves to this
interpretation, it would reach the same conclusion based on the purpose
of the legislature in enacting the law. That intent, according to the
court, was "to prevent lawfully arrested prisoners from escaping the
custody of the arresting officer." 7
(2) Attempted Manslaughter. Tillman v. State8 was an interest-
ing case in which the supreme court ruled that an issue on appeal had
not been properly preserved during the trial, but then went ahead and
considered it anyway. Tillman was convicted of second degree murder,
attempted manslaughter and carrying a concealed firearm. The defense
argued against the trial court's entering judgment on the attempted
manslaughter conviction, since there was no such offense under Florida
law. The judge disagreed and entered judgment on the three verdicts.
On appeal, Tillman raised, among others, the issue of the existence
of the crime of attempted manslaughter. The district court of appeal
affirmed all three convictions9 and certified to the Florida Supreme
Court the question of the existence of the crime of attempted man-
4. 367 So. 2d 700 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
5. Id. at 702, citing Warford v. State, 353 So. 2d 1263 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1978).
6. "Prisoner" is defined in FLA. STAT. § 944.02(5) (1981) as follows:
"Prisoner" means any person who is under arrest and in the lawful custody
of any law enforcement official, or any person convicted and sentenced by
any court and committed to any municipal or county jail or state prison,
prison farm, or penitentiary, or to the custody of the department, as pro-
vided by law.
7. Ramsey, 475 So. 2d at 673.
8. 471 So. 2d 32 (Fla. 1985).
9. Tillman v. State, 440 So. 2d 666 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
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slaughter as being of great public importance. 10
In Taylor v. State," an opinion written after the district court of
appeal affirmed Tillman's conviction, the supreme court stated that
there was a crime of attempted manslaughter in Florida, but such a
conviction "must be based on proof of an act ...with the requisite
criminal intent and may not be based on mere culpable negligence."2
In his brief to the supreme court, Tillman recognized that Taylor was
controlling but argued that he should get a new trial on the attempted
manslaughter count because of doubts about the evidence and the
jury's interpretation of it in light of the Taylor limitations.
Chief Justice Boyd, writing for a unanimous court approving the
district court of appeal's decision, stated that since Tillman had raised
no objection to the jury instructions which were given by the trial court
concerning the offense of attempted manslaughter, the issue was not
properly preserved for appeal. Moreover, the court went on to say that
after reviewing the record, there was sufficient evidence to support the
conclusion that Tillman had acted with the requisite criminal intent
and not with mere culpable negligence. 13
Tillman stands for the proposition that attempted manslaughter is
a prosecutable offense in Florida, but conviction must be based on a
showing of criminal intent and not mere culpable negligence.
(3) Drugs and Narcotics. Way v. State14 concerned the required
elements of proof for a proper conviction of trafficking in cocaine under
Florida Statute section 893.135(1)(b)(1).' 5 During Way's trial, the
court instructed the jury that in order to find Way guilty, they must
find that the state proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Way know-
ingly sold, delivered or possessed a certain substance; that he knew the
substance was cocaine or a mixture containing cocaine; and that the
quantity of the cocaine involved was twenty-eight grams or more. Way
requested that the jury be instructed that it could vote for conviction
only if the state proved that Way knew that the cocaine he possessed
10. Id. "Is there a crime of attempted manslaughter under the statutes of the
state of Florida?" Id.
11. 444 So. 2d 931 (Fla. 1983).
12. Id. at 934.
13. Tillman, 471 So. 2d at 35.
14. 475 So. 2d 239 (Fla. 1985).
15. FLA. STAT. § 893.135(I)(b)(1) (1983) provides: "Any person who knowingly
sells, manufactures, delivers, or brings into this state, or who is knowingly in actual or
constructive possession of, 28 grams or more of cocaine ... is guilty of a felony of the
first degree, which felony shall be known as 'trafficking in cocaine.'
1986]
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weighed twenty-eight grams or more; the judge refused the instruction.
Way was convicted and sentenced to three years imprisonment.
The district court of appeal affirmed,'16 expressly approving the
jury instructions given, and certified to the supreme court the question
of the requirement of proof of the defendant's knowledge of the weight
of the cocaine. 1
In a unanimous opinion, the supreme court approved the district
court of appeal's decision. Justice Overton, writing for the court, stated
that the statute requires proof of knowledge of the substance possessed,
but not proof of knowledge of its weight. "The word 'knowingly' as
used in the statute," the court stated, "modifies only the possession ele-
ment of the offense and not the quantity."' 8
(4) Grand Theft (of a motor vehicle). The facts in Davis v.
State'9 can be briefly stated. Davis attempted to purchase a $23,000
Mercedes-Benz automobile by means of a worthless check, and was
thereafter charged with first-degree grand theft under Florida Statute
section 812.014(2)(a) (theft of property with a value of $20,000 or
more). Davis moved to dismiss the information, arguing that he could
only be charged with second degree theft under Florida Statute section
812.014(2)(b) (theft of a motor vehicle). His argument was based on
State v. Getz,20 in which a conviction for grand theft of the second
degree by stealing a firearm was upheld notwithstanding the defend-
ant's contention that a firearm of a value less than $100 must be prose-
cuted under the petit theft statute. According to Davis, since Getz says
a firearm is a firearm, regardless of value, then an automobile is an
automobile, regardless of value - and theft of an automobile must be
charged as theft of "an automobile," and not theft of an item "of a
value of $20,000 or more." A majority of the supreme court found Da-
vis' reliance on Getz misplaced. While the legislature chose not to make
value an element of proof in certain named thefts (including firearms
and motor vehicles), it does not follow that the legislature has not given
the state discretion to make proof of value an element in more serious
thefts. Thus, the court held that the state could prosecute Davis for
16. Way v. State, 458 So. 2d 881 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
17. "It is proof that a defendant knows that the weight of the substance pos-
sessed equals 28 grams or more essential in obtaining a conviction under section
893.135(1)(b)?" Id. at 882.
18. Way, 475 So. 2d at 241.
19. 475 So. 2d 223 (Fla. 1985).
20. 435 So. 2d 789 (Fla. 1983).
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grand theft in the first degree and assume the burden of proving that
the value of the motor vehicle was $20,000 or more 1.2 The majority
opinion would appear unassailable in logic and reason; yet, interestingly
and surprisingly, three justices dissented, supporting Davis' position.2
(5) Retail Theft. In Emshwiller v. State,2 3 a case of interest but
of narrow scope, the supreme court answered the question of whether
or not "retail theft" was a separate crime from other theft. Reyling on
Tobe v. State,24 Emshwiller argued that retail theft of merchandise is a
separate crime from other theft and that a conviction under the retail
theft statute is necessarily a second-degree misdemeanor. The supreme
court disagreed. Retail theft under Florida Statute section 812.015 is a
species of the theft defined in section 812.014, not a separate crime for
penalty purposes. The court noted that section 812.015 does not contain
a penalty provision for first offenses, but merely provides for enhanced
penalties for second or subsequent convictions for theft of merchandise
or farm produce.25 Language in Tobe to the contrary was disapproved.
Another issue addressed by the court in the case involved the de-
termination of value. Emshwiller had requested a jury instruction that
"market value" was "what a willing seller is willing to accept and a
willing buyer is willing to pay when neither is compelled to sell or
buy." Instead, the trial judge instructed that the value was determined
by the sale price at the time the merchandise was stolen. The supreme
court approved the instruction of the trial judge. According to the
court, market value is the same as the retail price where the theft is
from a department store and salability at the retail price is
established.2"
(6) Burglary. The supreme court reviewed three cases in 1985
involving the burglary "presumption of intent" found in Florida Statute
section 810.07. The resulting opinions clarified the function and use
of the statute in burglary prosecutions.
21. Davis, 475 So. 2d at 224.
22. Id. at 225.
23. 462 So. 2d 457 (Fla. 1985).
24. 435 So. 2d 401 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
25. Emshwiller, 462 So. 2d at 458.
26. Id.
27. FLA. STAT. § 810.07 (1983) provides: "In a trial on the charge of burglary,
proof of the entering of such structure or conveyance of any time stealthily and without
consent of the owner or occupant thereof shall be prima facie evidence of entering with
intent to commit an offense."
1986]
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In the first case, L.S. v. State,28 the defendant, a juvenile, had
been charged with burglary by petition for delinquency. The charging
document specified that the defendant "did unlawfully enter or remain
in a certain structure ... with the intent to commit an offense therein,
to wit: THEFT in violation of section 810.02, Florida Statutes."29
In obtaining a conviction, the state relied on the presumption of
intent statute, which presumes intent to commit a crime upon a show-
ing of stealthy non-consensual entry. The defendant argued that since
the state had charged an intention to commit a specific offense, reliance
upon the statutory presumption was improper. Rather, the defendant
stated, the state must prove intent to commit the offense specified in
the charging document without the benefit of section 810.07. The de-
fendant relied on Bennett v. State,30 a case from the Second District
Court of Appeal.
Justice Adkins, writing for an unanimous court, was not persuaded
by the defendant's contentions and approved the Third District Court
of Appeal's affirmance of the conviction.3 In doing so, the court disap-
proved Bennett and stated that "the exact nature of the offense alleged
is ... surplusage so long as the essential element of intent to commit
an offense is alleged."3 2
In July, the court decided Toole v. State.33 An unanimous court,
again through Justice Adkins, reiterated its decision in L.S. v. State
and in greater detail discussed the legislative history of section 810.07,
the presumption of intent statute. While noting that in a charge of bur-
glary at common law the state had the burden of proving "intent to
commit a specified crime to the exclusion of all others,"3 4 the court
stated that such a requirement was no longer valid. In enacting section
810.07, the legislature clearly said that proof of intent to commit any
offense would suffice.
The court went on to state that the Bennett case, relied on by de-
fendants Toole and L.S., was in error in "imposing upon the state the
burden of proving a specific intent and additionally disproving all other
possible criminal intent. '3 5
28. 464 So. 2d 1195 (Fla. 1985).
29. Id. at 1195.
30. Bennett v. State, 438 So. 2d 1034 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
31. L.S. v. State, 446 So. 2d 1148 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
32. L.S., 464 So. 2d at 1196 (emphasis added).
33. 472 So. 2d 1174 (Fla. 1985).
34. Id. at 1176.
35. Id.
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Graham v. State,36 decided by the court in June, presented a dif-
ferent question regarding section 810.07. Graham was charged with at-
tempted burglary. The state relied on the presumption of intent statute,
since there was evidence of unlawful entry. The Fifth District Court of
Appeal affirmed, 37 and certified to the supreme court the question of
whether reliance on section 810.07 in an attempted burglary case was
proper. 38 The court, again through Justice Adkins and again unani-
mous, answered the question in the negative, refusing to give the stat-
ute effect beyond its clear, unambiguous terms. Since the statute by its
express terms pertains only to "a trial on the charge of burglary," it
may not be used in a prosecution for attempted burglary, even where
there is some evidence of actual illegal entry.
With the presumption of intent statute thus defined and narrowed
by these cases, practitioners should be more aware of the limits on the
state's reliance on the statutory presumption as well as its clear areas
of applicability.
II. Lesser Included and Multiple Offenses
Many of the court's criminal law decisions during 1985 dealt with
the issue of lesser included and multiple offenses arising from the same
event. As confessed by Justice Shaw in his concurring opinion in State
v. Enmund,39 the court has had "a long-standing problem with this is-
sue in its various permutations: single transaction rule, double jeop-
ardy, application of the Blockburger rule, lesser included offenses, and
generally, legislative intent in adopting section 775.021(4), Florida
Statutes (1977). "14o The Florida Supreme Court has not struggled with
this issue alone. Addressing the double jeopardy aspect of the problem
in Albernaz v. United States,4' Justice Rehnquist has called the deci-
sional law in the area "a veritable Sargasso Sea which could not fail to
36. 472 So. 2d 464 (Fla. 1985).
37. Graham v. State, 453 So. 2d 528 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
38. Id. at 529:
In a criminal case in which a defendant is charged with attempted bur-
glary, and there is proof at trial of defendant's unlawful entry into the
structure or residence involved, is it proper for the trial court to rely upon
the statutory presumption set forth in section 810.07 in instructing the jury
on proof of intent to commit an offense?
39. 476 So. 2d 165 (Fla. 1985).
40. Id. at 169.
41. 450 U.S. 333 (1981).
1986] 979
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challenge the most intrepid judicial navigator."42 Rather than trying to
navigate or fully understand the historical permutations of the problem,
it is better to examine what the Florida Supreme Court has most re-
cently said on the subject. Below is a brief survey of what appears to be
the most important Florida Supreme Court decisions in the area during
1985. 4s
A. State v. Watts.44 In Watts, the supreme court adopted a stat-
utory language oriented test which makes the legislature's choice of the
articles "a" or "any" determinative.
Watts had been adjudicated guilty and sentenced separately on
two counts of possession of prison-made knives. The First District
Court of Appeal held this to be in error, finding but a single offense for
the possession of both knives. 45 In reaching this conclusion, the court
applied the "chronological and special relationships" test previously
embraced by the Fifth District Court of Appeal in Castleberry v.
State.4 In so doing, the court recognized, but refused to adopt, the test
applied by the Second District Court of Appeal in State v. Grappin.47
Grappin involved prosecution for theft of five firearms under Florida
Statute section 812.014(2)(b)(3). 48 The Second District Court of Ap-
peal held that Grappin could properly be charged with five thefts since
the statute proscribed theft of "a" firearm, rather than theft of "any"
firearm. The reasoning was that the "a" in reference to "firearm" indi-
cated that the legislature clearly intended to make each firearm sepa-
rate for prosecution purposes. 49
Unfortunately, when the First District Court of Appeal had the
Watts case on appeal, it was not aware that the Florida Supreme Court
42. Id. at 343.
43. For the reader who desires a quick review of the Florida decisional law in the
area from 1942 through 1983, with some rather accurate predictive conclusions as to
the future course of the Florida Supreme Court, see Kaden, End of the Single Trans-
action Rule, FLA. B.J., December, 1983, at 693.
44. 462 So. 2d 813 (Fla. 1985).
45. Watts v. State, 440 So. 2d 505 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
46. 427 So. 2d 760 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
47. Grappin v. State, 450 So. 2d 480 (Fla. 1984).
48. FLA. STAT. ] 812].014(2)(b)(3) (1983) provides: "It is grand theft of the
second degree and a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in ss. 775.082,
775.083, and 775.084, if the property stolen is: 3. A firearm."
49. The exact reasoning process for reaching this conclusion was not entirely
clear, but apparently there was considerable reliance upon federal cases, cited in Grap-
pin, which had reached this conclusion when faced with similar statutory language.
Watts, 462 So. 2d at 814.
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would eventually not only affirm Grappin, but also adopt the reasoning
of the Second District Court of Appeal in the case. 50 Consequently,
when Watts reached the supreme court, the district court of appeal's
decision was approved, but not the court's reasoning. Watts had been
prosecuted under Florida Statute section 944.47, which essentially pro-
hibited as contraband in a correctional institution "any" firearm or
weapon. Looking at the statutory language, as was done in Grappin,
the court contrasted the article "any" with the article "a" and con-
cluded that the use of "any" by the legislature meant the transaction
must be treated as a single offense for prosecution purposes.
B. Wicker v. State.5" In Wicker, the supreme court considered
whether a defendant could be convicted of both first-degree felony bur-
glary and involuntary sexual battery, which served as the basis for the
burglary charge. The district court of appeal set aside the sexual bat-
tery conviction, based on its determination that the finding that the
defendant committed the assault was indispensible to the conviction of
the first-degree burglary.52 The supreme court found that the district
court of appeal erroneously analyzed the allegations in the charging
document to determine whether the convictions could stand, instead of
analyzing the offense's statutory elements.53 Relying on its 1984 deci-
sions in State v. Baker" and State v. Gibson,55 the supreme court
found that the convictions for both offenses were proper, and quashed
the district court of appeal's decision to the contrary.
C. Green v. State."6 Green was charged with first-degree premed-
itated murder as a result of a shooting death. At trial, he requested a
jury instruction on third-degree murder, asserting that the crime of dis-
charging a weapon into an occupied vehicle was the underlying felony.
The trial court refused, finding that third-degree murder is not a lesser
included offense of premeditated first-degree murder. On appeal, the
district court of appeal affirmed.57 Relying on the schedule of lesser
included offenses published in the 1981 version of the Florida Standard
Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases, the appellate court found that
third-degree felony murder is not a lesser included offense of premedi-
50. 450 So. 2d at 480.
51. 462 So. 2d 461 (Fla. 1985).
52. Wicker v. State, 445 So. 2d 581 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
53. Wicker, 462 So. 2d at 463.
54. 456 So. 2d 419 (Fla. 1984).
55. 452 So. 2d 553 (Fla. 1984).
56. 475 So. 2d 235 (Fla. 1985).
57. Green v. State, 453 So. 2d 526 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
1986]
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tated first-degree murder.
In its decision, the supreme court approved the result of the dis-
trict court of appeal but not the reasoning. While finding that third-
degree felony murder is not a necessarily included offense of first-de-
gree murder, the court stated that it is, under certain circumstances
and evidence, a proper, permissive, lesser included offense of first-de-
gree murder, requiring a jury instruction to that effect.
Since the court had repeatedly allowed a felony murder conviction
to be sustained under an indictment for first-degree premeditated mur-
der, and since third-degree felony murder was listed in the schedule of
lesser included offenses of first-degree felony murder, the court con-
cluded that the district court of appeal erred in its reasoning. However,
the district court of appeal was correct in its approval of the trial
court's refusal to give the instructions. This result was reached after an
analysis of Amended Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.490, which
requires the giving of instructions on a lesser included offense only
where supported by the evidence. Since the evidence did not support
the underlying felony required for third-degree felony murder, the re-
quested instruction on that offense was properly denied.
D. Garcia v. State.5 8 In Garcia, the Fifth District Court of Ap-
peal certified to the supreme court the following question as being of
great public importance: "Whether one can be convicted, although not
sentenced, of a lesser included offense after he has been convicted of
the greater crime?" This question was framed similarly to the question
in State v. Enmund,5 9 except "lesser included offense" was used instead
of "the underlying felony." This is significant, because as the decision
points out, they are not the same. Garcia was found guilty of armed
robbery"0 and displaying, using, threatening, or attempting to use a
firearm during the commission of a felony.61 On appeal, the district
court of appeal "noted" in its position that the defendant had been
convicted of both a greater and a lesser included offense, and thus
framed its certified question.6 2
Referring to its Enmund decision, the supreme court wrote that it
had already essentially answered the question posed by the lower court.
58. 444 So. 2d 969 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1983), afl'd, 476 So. 2d 170 (Fla.
1985).
59. 476 So. 2d 165 (Fla. 1985).
60. In violation of FLA. STAT. § 812.13(2)(a) (1981).
61. In violation of FLA. STAT. § 790.07(2) (1981).
62. Garcia, 444 So. 2d at 970.
982 [Vol. 10
10
Nova Law Review, Vol. 10, Iss. 3 [1986], Art. 3
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol10/iss3/3
Criminal Law
Actually the question had been answered in Bell v. State, 3 where the
court held that the double jeopardy clause prohibited multiple convic-
tions and sentences for both the greater and lesser included offenses,
and in State v. Baker,6 4 which limited Bell to necessarily lesser in-
cluded offenses. Therefore, the answer to the district court's question
was in the negative: One can neither be convicted of nor sentenced for
a necessarily lesser included offense.65
As noted by the court, however, this answer does not resolve the
case. Because they have different statutory elements, the firearm of-
fense is not necessarily included in the robbery offense. Both offenses
may be separately charged and punished.66 While the certified question
was therefore irrelevant to the case, it did result in further clarification
of this often confusing issue.
E. State v. Enmund.17 The Enmund case had a long journey
through the federal and Florida appellate courts before arriving at the
Florida Supreme Court for the third time. 8 The certified question from
the Second District Court of Appeal in the instant case was succinctly
stated: "When a defendant is convicted of felony murder, can he be
convicted of, although not sentenced for, the underlying felony?"'6 9
The question was not so succinctly answered, however, as the court
determined that the underlying felony (robbery) was not a necessarily
lesser included offense, and proceeded to overrule its earlier decision in
State v. Hegstrom.0 In Hegstrom, the court stated that the underlying
felony was a necessarily included offense within the crime of felony
murder, and held that the defendant could be convicted of the underly-
ing felony of robbery, but not sentenced for both the underlying felony
63. 437 So. 2d 1057 (Fla. 1983).
64. 456 So. 2d 419 (Fla. 1984).
65. 476 So. 2d at 170.
66. Id.
67. 476 So. 2d 165 (Fla. 1985).
68. Enmund, a death penalty case, was initially affirmed by the Florida Supreme
Court in Enmund v. State, 399 So. 2d 1362 (Fla. 1981). In a leading eighth amend-
ment decision, the United States Supreme Court reversed the death sentence, holding it
to be excessive for a participant in a felony murder who does not himself kill, attempt
to kill, or intend that the killing occur or that lethal force be employed. Enmund v.
Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982). On remand, the Florida Supreme Court vacated the
death penalty and returned the case to the trial court for resentencing. Enmund v.
Florida, 439 So. 2d 1383 (Fla. 1983). The instant case is thus the third visit of the case
to the Florida Supreme Court.
69. 459 So. 2d 1160 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
70. 401 So. 2d 1343 (Fla. 1981).
1986]
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and the murder. The court based its holding in Enmund on its study of
Missouri v. Hunter,71 determining that the United States Supreme
Court in that case had made it clear that the Blockburger rule of statu-
tory construction 72 will not prevail over legislative intent. The court
went on to find sufficient intent on the part of the legislature for multi-
ple punishments when both a murder and a separate felony occur dur-
ing a single criminal episode. 73 Thus the court ruled in answer to the
certified question, "that the underlying felony is not a necessarily lesser
included offense of felony murder and that a defendant can be con-
victed of and sentenced for both felony murder and the underlying
felony. ' 74
F. State v. Snowden. 5 Snowden was tried for both first degree
murder and armed robbery. Upon request of defense counsel the jury
was instructed that grand theft could be considered as an underlying
felony of third-degree murder. Snowden was convicted for third-degree
murder and grand theft. The district court of appeal considered
whether the defendant may be legally convicted of third-degree (fel-
ony) murder and at the same time be convicted of the underlying fel-
ony on which the murder conviction is based.70 Making a determined
effort to analyze the maze of seemingly conflicting decisions extant at
that time, the court concluded that the jury had convicted Snowden of
grand theft as the underlying felony of third-degree murder and, on the
71. 459 U.S. 359 (1983).
72. Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932). "The applicable rule is
that where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory
provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only
one, is whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not." Id. at
304. The Blockburger rule has essentially been incorporated into FLA. STAT. §
775.021(4) (1983), which presently reads:
(4) Whoever, in the course of one criminal transaction or episode, com-
mits separate criminal offense, upon conviction and adjudication of guilt,
shall be sentenced separately for each criminal offense; and the sentencing
judge may order the sentences to be served concurrently or consecutively.
For the purposes of this subsection, offenses are separate if each offense
requires proof of an element that the other does not, without regard to the
accusatory pleading or the proof adduced at trial.
73. Enmund, 476 So. 2d at 167. Accord Vause v. State, 476 So. 2d 141 (Fla.
1985).
74. Enrnund, 476 So. 2d at 168.
75. 476 So. 2d 191 (Fla. 1985).
76. 449 So. 2d 332 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
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basis of Bell v. State,77 set aside both the conviction and sentence for
grand theft. Unfortunately, the district court of appeal did not have the
guidance of the supreme court's decision in State v. Baker,78 which
limited the Bell holding to "necessarily lesser included offenses," as the
Baker decision was still some three months away. Adhering to its cur-
rent reasoning on the issue, the supreme court concluded that grand
theft, as the underlying felony of third-degree murder, is not a lesser
included offense, and quashed the decision of the district court.79 In a
footnote to its decision, the supreme court called attention to Florida
Statute section 775.021(4), which incorporates the Blockburger rule;
the court said that henceforth, "the Florida Standard Jury Instructions
in Criminal Cases (1981), which set forth what had heretofore been
lesser included offenses, must be read and modified in light of this leg-
islative decision. s
°
G. State v. O'Hara.8' O'Hara involved the question of whether
one could be convicted of both extortion and theft for the taking of only
one sum of money. The district court of appeal answered the question
in the negative.82 The supreme court, relying on its decision in State v.
Baker,88 held that one can be convicted of two crimes for the taking of
only one sum of money, provided that neither crime is a necessarily
lesser included offense of the other. Since one may commit extortion
without thieving and one may commit theft without extorting, neither
crime is a necessarily lesser included offense of the other. Thus the
court held that the Baker test was satisfied, and quashed the decision
of the district court of appeal. 8'
III. Defenses to Crimes
A. Entrapment. Perhaps the most significant change in Florida
criminal law during 1985 was in the area of the entrapment defense. In
January, the supreme court decided State v. Glosson,8 5 determining
that the contingent fee agreement with the informant in that case vio-
77. 437 So. 2d 1057 (Fla. 1983).
78. 456 So. 2d 419 (Fla. 1984).
79. Snowden, 476 So. 2d at 191-92.
80. Id. at 192.
81. 478 So. 2d 24 (Fla. 1985).
82. O'Hara v. State, 448 So. 2d 424 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
83. 452 So. 2d 927 (Fla. 1984).
84. O'Hara, 478 So. 2d at 26.
85. 462 So. 2d 1082 (Fla. 1985).
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lated the defendant's due process rights under the state constitution.
Within two months, in Cruz v. State,86 the court made even more sig-
nificant changes in the entrapment defense by adding an objective test
to the subjective test for entrapment. In April, the court decided State
v. Wheeler87 and Rotenberry v. State,88 which addressed the burden of
proof and jury instruction for the entrapment defense.
(1) State v. Glosson.89 Glosson and five co-defendants were
charged with trafficking and conspiring to traffic in cannabis. The
charges grew out of a "reverse-sting" operation run by the county sher-
iff's department. Motions to dismiss based on entrapment and
prosecutorial misconduct were filed. The motions were based primarily
upon an agreement struck between an informant and the county sheriff
whereby the informant would receive a percentage of all civil forfeit-
ures arising out of successful criminal investigations the informant in-
stigated in the county. The agreement with the sheriff was oral, but the
state attorney's office knew of the agreement and even supervised the
informant's investigations. In order to collect his 10% contingent fee,
the informant was required to cooperate in the criminal investigations
and testify in court. The fee would be paid out of civil forfeitures re-
sulting from the criminal investigation initiated by the informant. The
trial court dismissed the charges, finding a due process violation. The
district court of appeal affirmed the dismissal, holding that the consti-
tutional due process issue was an issue of law for the trial court, and
that the contingent fee arrangement with the informant violated the
defendant's due process right.
In analyzing the issues, the Florida Supreme Court recognized
that the due process argument concerning the entrapment defense had
not fared well in the federal courts." Noting with approval decisions
from two states that recognize the due process defense to overturn
criminal convictions, 91 the court rejected as too narrow the application
86. 465 So. 2d 516 (Fla. 1985).
87. 468 So. 2d 978 (Fla. 1985).
88. 468 So. 2d 971 (Fla. 1985).
89. 441 So. 2d 1117 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
90. The court noted that the United States Supreme Court, in dicta in United
States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423 (1973), seemed to recognize the due process entrap-
ment defense; however, it noted that in more recent years only one due process defense
has been raised successfully in only one federal circuit court. Glosson, 462 So. 2d at
1084.
91. State v. Hohensee, 650 S.W.2d 268 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) and People v.
Isaacson, 44 N.Y.2d 511, 406 N.Y.S.2d 714, 378 N.E.2d 78 (1978).
986 [Vol. 10
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of the due process entrapment defense found in the federal courts. Re-
lying on article 1, section 9 of the Florida Constitution, the court held
that governmental misconduct which violates the constitutional due
process right of the defendant, regardless of that defendant's predispo-
sition, requires the dismissal of criminal charges. Finding in this case
that the contingent fee agreement with the informant, who was a vital
state witness, violated the defendants' due process rights under the
Florida Constitution, the court approved the district court of appeal's
decision affirming the dismissal of the charges.92
(2) Cruz v. State.9 3 The decision in Cruz resulted from a
"drunken bum" police decoy operation undertaken in a high-crime area
of Tampa. A police officer, posing as a drunk, pretended to drink wine
from a bottle, while leaning against a building near an alleyway, face
to the wall. Plainly visible and hanging from his pants pocket was $150
in currency, paper-clipped together. Cruz and a woman companion
happened by about 10:00 P.M. Cruz initially approached the decoy,
but then went on his way. Returning ten to fifteen minutes later with
his companion, Cruz took the money from the decoy's pocket, where-
upon he was arrested. Subsequently charged with grand theft, he
moved for a dismissal, arguing that the arrest constituted entrapment
as a matter of law. The trial court granted the motion, relying on State
v. Casper94 in finding that the defendant was not predisposed to com-
mit the crime and had been entrapped as a matter of law. The district
court of appeal reversed, 95 holding that predisposition is a question of
fact and should not be decided on a motion to dismiss.
In one of its most important decisions of 1985, the supreme court
quashed the district court of appeal's decision, finding that the facts
surrounding the "drunken bum" police decoy operation constituted en-
trapment as a matter of law under its therein announced threshold test.
92. Glosson, 462 So. 2d at 1085.
.93. 465 So. 2d 516 (Fla. 1985).
94. 417 So. 2d 264 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.), review denied, 418 So. 2d 1280
(Fla. 1982). Casper involved a "drunken bum" decoy scenario almost identical to that
in Cruz. The Casper decision focused on "predisposition" and held that the state must
prove the defendant was predisposed to steal from the decoy. "Predisposition" could be
proved in one of four given ways, but under the facts the question boiled down to
whether the defendant readily acquiesced to the crime, or "succumbed to temptation."
According to Casper, this was a matter of law; where the trial judge finds the defend-
ant succumbed to temptation, the matter should not go to the jury, as it is entrapment
as a matter of law. Cruz, 465 So. 2d at 518-19.
95. State v. Cruz, 426 So. 2d 1308 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
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While agreeing with the lower court that the question of predisposition
will always be a question of fact for the jury, the supreme court found
that a second, independent, standard should be established for assessing
entrapment. This second standard would examine the official conduct
inducing the crime, and would be a question of law, decided by the
trial judge. Thus, a two-test approach was established by the Cruz de-
cision. The threshold test for the entrapment defense is an objective
test, decided by the trial judge. To answer this test, the judge must
determine if the police activity: (1) has as its end the interruption of a
specific ongoing criminal activity, and (2) utilizes means reasonably
tailored to apprehend those involved in the ongoing criminal activity. If
the judge answers both questions in the affirmative, then entrapment as
a matter of law has not occurred. The first prong of this threshold test
asks if the police activity is seeking to prosecute crime where no such
crime exists except for the police activity engendering the crime.96 The
second prong of the threshold test looks toward the appropriateness of
the police activity. In examining the appropriateness of the police activ-
ity, the court should consider whether a government agent
induced or encouraged another person to engage in conduct consti-
tuting such offense by either (a) making knowingly false represen-
tations designed to induce the belief that such conduct is not pro-
hibited; or (b) employing methods of persuasion or inducement
which create a substantial risk that such an offense will be commit-
ted by persons other than those who are ready to commit it.97
Once the objective test is applied and the trial judge determines
that the state has established the validity of the police activity, the sub-
jective test for "predisposition" is to be answered by the jury. This test
requires that the jury determine whether the criminal design originated
with the government officials and was implanted in the mind of the
defendant who was an otherwise innocent person, or whether the de-
fendant was predisposed to commit the crime. Thus a dual test, both
objective and subjective, and involving determinations initially by the
judge and then by the jury, was adopted by the Florida Supreme Court
as the new entrapment defense. In Cruz, the court found that the
"drunken bum" police decoy activity constituted entrapment as a mat-
ter of law under the threshold objective test.
96. Cruz, 465 So. 2d at 522.
97. Id.
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Whether the new Florida standard is consistent with or departs
from the "great weight of judicial authority in the United States," was
debated in the specially concurring opinion of Justice Overton and the
dissenting opinion of Justice Alderman. 98 Regardless of the answer to
this question, a new standard for the entrapment defense has been es-
tablished in Florida by the Cruz decision.99
(3) State v. Wheeler and Rotenberry v. State. In State v.
Wheeler'00 and Rotenberry v. State,101 the supreme court addressed the
issue of the burden of proof in the entrapment defense. The problem in
Wheeler resulted from a colloquy between the defense counsel, assis-
tant state attorney, and trial judge during the closing argument.
Among other statements during the exchange, the trial judge stated in
front of the jury that in his proposed instruction he was not going to
include "any instruction to the effect that the State is required to prove
the defendant was not entrapped." The judge's statement was based on
the entrapment instruction found in Florida Standard Jury Instruction
(Criminal) 3.04(c).0 2 That jury instruction does not include a clear
98. Id. (quoting from MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.13 (1962)).
99. Id. at 523-24. The leading United States Supreme Court cases on entrap-
ment are Houpton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484 (1976); United States v. Russell, 411
U.S. 423 (1973); Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369 (1958); and Sorrelli v.
United States, 287 U.S. 435 (1932). A substantial portion of the majority opinion in
Cruz was devoted to a discussion of these cases.
100. 468 So. 2d 978 (Fla. 1985).
101. 468 So. 2d 971 (Fla. 1985).
102. The full text of instruction 3.04(c) reads:
3.04(c) Entrapment
The defense of entrapment has been raised. This means that (defendant)
claims he had no prior intention to commit the offense and that he com-
mitted it Only because he was persuaded or caused to commit the offense
by law enforcement officers.
(Defendant) was entrapped if:
1. he had no prior intention to commit (crime charged), but
2. he was persuaded, induced or lured into committing the offense and
3. the person who persuaded, induced or lured into committing the of-
fense was a law enforcement officer, or someone acting for the officer.
However, it is not entrapment, merely because a law enforcement officer in
a good faith attempt to detect crime:
a. (provided the defendant the opportunity, means and facilities to com-
mit the offense, which the defendant intended to commit, and would have
committed otherwise.)
b. (used tricks, decoys or subterfuge to expose the defendant's criminal
acts.)
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statement of the burden of proof. Nevertheless, the supreme court held
that in the usual case this instruction is adequate, when given in combi-
nation with the general reasonable doubt and burden of proof instruc-
tion found in Florida Standard Jury Instruction (Criminal) 2.03. A
specific "burden of proof' instruction had not been included within the
entrapment instructions when the instructions were rewritten in 1981,
in order to avoid undue emphasis as to the state's burden of proof. In
Wheeler, however, the supreme court found that the statements of the
trial judge created an erroneous impression on the jury concerning the
burden of proof that was not corrected by a proper instruction. For a
general rule concerning the burden of proof in an entrapment defense,
the supreme court stated that "[w]hen the defendant has adduced suffi-
cient evidence to make a prima facie case of entrapment, the burden of
proof regarding entrapment shifts entirely to the state. After the bur-
den has shifted, no consideration of the defendant's initial burden is
uermissible. ' 'a03
In Rotenberry, the court carried the Wheeler decision one step fur-
ther. In Wheeler, the issue did not involve a specific request by the
defendant that the court instruct the jury that the state must prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendaht was not the victim of
entrapment. In Rotenberry, the certified question from the district
court of appeal dealt with such a request.104 In answering the question,
the court held, as it did in Wheeler, that instruction 3.04(c) (the stan-
dard entrapment instruction), when given in combination with the gen-
eral reasonable doubt instruction, is adequate. This combination fully
informs the jury of the state's burden. The court noted that a "delicate
c. (was present and pretending to aid or assist in the commission of the
offense.)
If you find from the evidence that the defendant was entrapped, or if
the evidence raises a reasonable doubt about the defendant's guilt, you
should find him not guilty.
A margin note advised that factors a, b, and c are to be given as applicable.
103. Rotenberry, 468 So. 2d at 981.
104. Rotenberry v. State, 429 So. 2d 378, 380 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1983):
If the state has the burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a
defendant was not entrapped when that defense has been raised, is the
giving of the present entrapment instruction as set forth in Standard Jury
Instruction 3.04(c) along with the general reasonable doubt instruction
sufficient, notwithstanding the defendant having specifically requested the
Court to instruct the jury that the state must prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendant was not the victim of entrapment by law enforce-
ment officers?
[Vol. 10
18
Nova Law Review, Vol. 10, Iss. 3 [1986], Art. 3
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol10/iss3/3
Criminal Law
balance has been struck between informing the jury on the law of en-
trapment and avoiding undue emphasis on the state's burden of
proof."105 The court thus gave its approval of the trial judge's refusal to
give any additional, specific instruction on the state's burden of proof in
an entrapment defense, even when requested by the defense.
B. Self-defense. A self-defense issue of narrow applicability was
addressed by the supreme court in State v. Holley.0 6 Holley was
charged with resisting arrest with violence, among other crimes, stem-
ming from his arrest at an agricultural inspection station for carrying
cannabis. At trial, Holley contended that the agricultural inspector had
threatened him with a knife during the arrest and that this caused him
to resist arrest. He requested a jury instruction that resistance to arrest
is justified to the extent necessary for self-defense, as stated in two
First District Court of Appeal opinions.10 7 The trial court denied the
request, and instead gave the then existing standard instruction: "A
person is never justified in the use of any force to resist an arrest."10 8
Holley was convicted on all charges and appealed, inter alia, the denial
of the requested jury instruction. The First District Court of Appeal
reversed his conviction for resisting arrest with violence on the basis of
the denial of the requested instruction in light of Ivester and Allen, but
certified the issue as a question of great public importance. 0 9
The supreme court, in a 4-2 opinion authored by Justice Overton,
approved the First District Court of Appeal's reversal, stating that the
law permits a defendant to resist the use of excessive force in making
the arrest. The court further noted that the standard jury instruction at
issue in the case had been changed as of October 10, 1985, to reflect
the correct statement of the law."0 The standard jury instruction now
reads:
105. Rotenberry, 468 So. 2d at 975.
106. 480 So. 2d 94 (Fla. 1985).
107. Ivester v. State, 398 So. 2d 926 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1981), review de-
nied, 412 So. 2d 470 (Fla. 1982); Allen v. State, 424 So. 2d 101 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 1982), review denied, 436 So. 2d 97 (Fla. 1983).
108. FLORIDA STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTION (CRIM.) 3.04(d).
109. Holley v. State, 464 So. 2d 578, 579 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1984): "Is the
Florida Standard Jury Instruction (Criminal) 3.04(d) a correct statement of the law in
light of Ivester v. State, 398 So. 2d 926 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1981), review denied,
412 So. 2d 470 (Fla. 1982), and Allen v. State, 424 So. 2d 101 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1982), review denied, 436 So. 2d 97 (Fla. 1983)?"
110. See The Florida Bar Re: Standard Jury Instructions (Criminal Cases), 477
So. 2d 985 (Fla. 1985).
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A person is not justified in using force to resist an arrest by a law
enforcement officer who is known, or reasonably appears to be a
law enforcement officer. However, if an officer uses excessive force
to make an arrest, then a person is justified in the use of reasonable
force to defend himself (or another), but only to the extent he rea-
sonably believes such force is necessary.1 10.1
The court reversed only the conviction for resisting arrest, leaving
the conviction for the other crimes intact, since it found that the erro-
neous instruction applied only to the resisting arrest charge.11'
C. Voluntary Intoxication. Linehan v. State"' involved the de-
fense of voluntary intoxication to arson and felony murder. Briefly, the
facts included a confession by the defendant that he set fire to his girl-
friend's apartment, which resulted in one death. Testimony at trial in-
dicated that defendant had been intoxicated at the time he set the fire.
Based on this testimony, he requested, but was denied, an instruction
on voluntary intoxication as a defense."i 3 On appeal, the Second Dis-
trict Court of Appeal affirmed the trial judge's refusal,"4 finding that
voluntary intoxication is not a defense to arson"15 and, further, that
voluntary intoxication is not a defense to felony murder if it is not a
defense to the underlying felony.
However, the district court certified these two issues to the su-
preme court as being of great public importance."' The supreme court
affirmed the district court on both issues.
The court disagreed with the defendant's argument that the words
110.1 Id. at 1000.
111. Chief Justice Boyd, with whom Justice Shaw concurred, dissented only
from this part of the majority opinion. The Chief Justice would have reversed all of the
convictions arising from Holley's disarming his would-be captors and fleeing with their
weapons. The defendant was entitled, in Justice Boyd's view, to have the jury deter-
mine the facts pertaining to all of the charges (resisting arrest, two counts of aggra-
vated assault with a firearm, and two counts of robbery) under legally correct instruc-
tions from the court.
112. 476 So. 2d 1262 (Fla. 1985).
113. Id. at 1263. He also requested an instruction on second-degree (depraved
mind) murder as a lesser included offense of felony murder. This was also refused. The
latter refusal resulted in the district court of appeal reversing the conviction, and is
briefly discussed under the section above dealing with lesser included offenses.
114. Linehan v. State, 442 So. 2d 244 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
115. Id. at 253-254.
116. The two issues were framed as the following questions: "1. Whether volun-
tary intoxication is a defense to arson or to any other crime. 2. Whether voluntary
intoxication is a defense to first degree (felony) murder." Linehan, 442 So. 2d at 256.
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"willfully and unlawfully" as contained in the arson statute1 7 are
words of specific intent. The court noted that the present statutory defi-
nition of arson does not materially differ from the common law defini-
tion"' s with regard to the requisite intent, and that at common law ar-
son was a general intent crime. And while voluntary intoxication has
for many years been a defense to specific intent crimes, it does not
apply to general intent crimes such as arson. Finding no legislative in-
tention to change the common law intent requirement, the court held
that arson under Florida Statute section 806.01 was a general intent
crime and, therefore, voluntary intoxication is not a defense to arson.
With regard to whether voluntary intoxication could be a defense
to felony murder, the court noted its decision in Jacobs v. State,19
where it held that when robbery was the underlying felony of a felony
murder, the defendant could defend on the basis that he was too intoxi-
cated to form the intent to commit the underlying felony. However, the
court further noted, robbery at common law was a specific intent crime,
whereas in the instant case, the underlying felony of arson is a general
intent crime. The court concluded that when the underlying felony is
based on a specific intent offense, the defense of voluntary intoxication
may apply to felony murder, but when the underlying felony is a gen-
eral intent crime, voluntary intoxication is not a defense.12 0
D. Insanity Defense. In Patten v. State,'21 the supreme court had
the opportunity to reaffirm its test for insanity at the time of the of-
fense as being the modified M'Naghten test, as contained in Florida
Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases. 22 It also addressed a
rather unusual "burden of proof" issue related to the insanity defense.
Patten was charged with first-degree murder and a number of
other felonies. At a court-ordered competency hearing, four experts
were of the unanimous opinion that the defendant was competent to
stand trial, notwithstanding the fact that three years earlier he had
been found not guilty of receiving stolen property by reason of insanity.
At trial, defendant's counsel had urged the trial court to discard the
117. FLA. STAT. § 806.01 (1981).
118. The supreme court said that at common law, arson was defined as "the
willful and malicious burning of a dwelling house, or outhouse within the curtilage of a
dwelling of another," Linehan, 476 So. 2d at 1265, citing Duke v. State, 132 Fla. 865,
870, 185 So. 422, 425 (1938).
119. 396 So. 2d 1113 (Fla.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 933 (1981).
120. Linehan, 476 So. 2d at 1265.
121. 467 So. 2d 975 (Fla. 1985).
122. See FLORIDA STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTION (CRIM.) 2.11 (b)-I and 3.04(b).
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M'Naghten rule and adopt the American Law Institute Model Penal
Code rule, including the "irresistible impulse" test.123 After briefly al-
luding to the 1977 Wheeler decision, 2 which directed that the present
modified M'Naghten test be applied in all Florida criminal trials, the
court approved the trial judge's denial of the defendant's motion and
went on to address the burden of proof issue.
Patten had argued that because of his prior adjudication of not
guilty by reason of insanity, and subsequent civil commitment, the state
had the burden of establishing his sanity as an element of the offense,
despite his failure to offer any evidence of an insanity defense at
trial.125 Rejecting this argument, the supreme court noted that insanity
is an affirmative defense in Florida, and the burden is upon the defend-
ant to come forth and present some evidence of insanity at trial. It is
only upon this showing that the prosecution has the burden of disprov-
ing defendant's claim beyond a reasonable doubt. The court went on to
state that Patten's argument that his prior adjudication of not guilty by
reason of insanity, and subsequent civil commitment, require the state
to prove competency, "is correct only when the defense of insanity is
asserted and evidence of the adjudication and commitment is intro-
duced at trial."' 26 At the trial no such evidence was introduced; there-
fore, the prosecution had nothing to rebut. 27
A somewhat similar holding was made in Alvoid v. State,128 where
the supreme court rejected Alvoid's claims "that his prior adjudication
in Michigan of not guilty by reason of insanity, his resulting commit-
ment, and the fact that there has not been a subsequent judicial resto-
ration of sanity result in a continuing presumption of insanity.' 29
Yohn v. State,"10 another case involving the insanity defense, re-
minds us of the rather ironic warning by the supreme court that its
approval of the standard jury instructions does not insure that the use
of such instructions by the trial judge will meet with the supreme
123. Patten, 467 So. 2d at 978.
124. Wheeler v. State, 344 So. 2d 244 (Fla. 1977).
125. Patten, 467 So. 2d at 978.
126. Id. at 979.
127. The court noted that the reason for the lack of evidence of insanity was
clear from the record: "The appellant had no experts to testify as to his insanity. The
State had four witnesses who concluded he was sane and two went further and stated
that he was faking mental illness." Id. at 975.
128. 459 So. 2d 316 (Fla. 1984).
129. Id. at 318.
130. 476 So. 2d 123 (Fla. 1985).
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court's approval upon review of a specific case on appeal.131 Yohn had
been charged with the first degree murder, by shooting, of a woman
who had been having an affair with Yohn's husband.132 The defense
presented expert testimony by a psychiatrist and a psychologist that
Yohn was insane at the time of the shooting; thereafter, the defense
requested special jury instructions stating that the state had the burden
of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was sane at the
time of the incident.1 33 This special instruction was refused; however,
the relevant standard jury instructions, including the instructions on in-
sanity 34 and the state's burden to prove guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt, 135 were given by the court.1 36 The First District Court of Appeal
concluded that even though the requested instructions correctly stated
the Florida law, the given instructions were adequate considering the
instructions as a whole. 137 In reversing, the Florida Supreme Court
ruled that the instructions given did not adequately and correctly
charge the jury as to the Florida law on the issue. The problem found
by the court with the standard jury instrufction on insanity was that the
instruction frames the issue as one of finding the defendant legally in-
sane, thus placing the burden on the defendant. The jury is never in-
structed in the standard charge that the state must prove anything with
regard to sanity. The court noted that the standard jury instruction on
reasonable doubt and burden of proof'3 8 did not remedy the problem as
this instruction was general and the insanity instructions were specific.
While the general instruction referred to the state's burden of proving
every element, nowhere in the instructions was it stated that sanity was
an element, which, according to the court, it clearly is.' 3 9 Since the
defendant's requested special instructions 4 ° correctly and accurately
131. See In the Matter of the Use by Trial Courts of Standard Jury Instructions
in Criminal Cases, 431 So. 2d 594, modified, 431 So. 2d 599 (Fla. 1981): "[T]he court
recognizes that no approval of these instructions by the court could relieve the trial
judge of his responsibility under the law to charge the jury properly and correctly in
each case as it comes before him."
132. Yohn v. State, 450 So. 2d 898 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
133. Id. at 899-900.
134. FLORIDA STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS (CRIM.) 3.04(b).
135. FLORIDA STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS (CRIM.) 2.03.
136. Yohn, 450 So. 2d at 900.
137. Id. at 901.
138. FLORIDA STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS (CRIM.) 2.03.
139. Citing Parkin v. State, 238 So. 2d 817 (Fla. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S.
974 (1971).
140. The requested instructions are set forth in both Yohn v. State, 476 So. 2d
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set forth the law, and the standard jury instructions given did not, the
supreme court quashed the decision of the district court of appeal and
ordered the case remanded for a new trial.
It should be noted that the supreme court split four to three in the
decision. The dissenters relied on Rotenberry v. State,14 1 which is dis-
cussed above and which dealt with the defense of entrapment. In
Rotenberry, the defendant had requested that the jury be instructed
that the state must prove that the defendant was not entrapped beyond
a reasonable doubt. The trial court refused and instead merely gave the
standard jury instruction on entrapment and burden of proof.
Rotenberry was affirmed by the district court of appeal 42 but the issue
of the sufficiency of instructions was certified to the supreme court,
where it was approved as striking a delicate balance between "inform-
ing the jury on the law of entrapment and avoiding undue emphasis on
the state's burden of proof.' 43
E. Double Jeopardy. Double jeopardy is an issue mixed inextri-
cably with the issues of lesser included and multiple offenses, discussed
in Part II, above. Consequently, many cases, such as Houser v.
State,'4 which follows, could be placed under the heading of "double
jeopardy" or "lesser included and multiple offenses." In Houser v.
State, the court addressed the certified question of "whether a defend-
ant may be properly convicted of and sentenced for both DWI man-
slaughter and vehicular homicide for effecting a single death" without
constituting double jeopardy. 45 In answering that question in the nega-
tive, the court clarified the extent to which a defendant may be prose-
cuted for a death caused by his driving while intoxicated.
Houser had a blood alcohol level of 0.18% when the car he was
driving struck a concrete wall, killing a passenger. He was charged
with DWI manslaughter11 6 and vehicular homicide, 147 and convicted
and sentenced on both charges. The First District Court of Appeal af-
firmed the convictions and sentences,' 48 but certified the above question
as being of great public importance. The district court of appeal also
123 (Fla. 1985), and Yohn v. State, 450 So. 2d 898 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
141. 468 So. 2d 971 (Fla. 1985).
142. 429 So. 2d 378 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
143. Rotenberry, 468 So. 2d at 975.
144. 474 So. 2d 1193 (Fla. 1985).
145. Houser, 474 So. 2d at 1195.
146. In violation of FLA. STAT. § 316.1931(2) (1983).
147. In violation of FLA. STAT. § 782.071 (1983).
148. Houser v. State, 456 So. 2d 1265 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
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recognized that its decision was directly in conflict with the Fifth Dis-
trict Court of Appeal's decision in Vela v. State.14 9
The supreme court rejected the lower court's two-fold rationale
that, first, convictions under both statutes did not violate double jeop-
ardy since each crime was separate from the other in that each "re-
quires proof of an element which the other does not"; and second, that
DWI manslaughter is merely an enhancement of the penalty for driv-
ing while intoxicated. 150 The supreme court stated that although under
the Blockburger test151 and its statutory equivalent 52 the crimes are
separate, these tests "are only tools of statutory interpretation which
cannot contravene the contrary interest of the legislature."5 3 The "as-
sumption underlying the Blockburger rule is that the legislature ordi-
narily does not intend to punish the same offense under two different
statutes."' 54 The court noted that Florida courts have determined in
many cases, including cases directly on point with Houser,55 that the
legislature did not intend to punish a single homicide under two differ-
ent statutes.
In rejecting the district court of appeal's rationale that DWI man-
slaughter is simply an enhanced penalty for driving while intoxicated,
the court simply stated that the death of a victim "raised DWI man-
slaughter beyond mere enhancement and places it squarely within the
scope of this state's regulation of homicide."' 56
In October, 1985, the court in State v. Gordon'57 reiterated its
decision in Houser by approving the Fifth District Court of Appeal's
decision vacating the DWI manslaughter conviction of the appellant,
who had also been convicted of second degree murder for the same
death. The supreme court simply relied on the rationale expressed in
Houser in upholding the district court of appeal's decision.
Gordon and Houser made clear that, absent an unambiguous spec-
ified legislative statement authorizing prosecution of a defendant for
149. 450 So. 2d 305 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
150. Houser, 474 So. 2d at 1196. See also FLA. STAT. § 775.021(4) (1983).
151. Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932).
152. FLA. STAT. § 775.021(4) (1983).
153. Houser, 474 So. 2d at 1196.
154. Id. at 1196, quoting Ball v. United States, 105 S. Ct. 1668, 1672 (1985).
155. Houser, 474 So. 2d at 1197, citing Ubellis v. State, 384 So. 2d 1294 (Fla.
2d Dist. Ct. App. 1980), and Brown v. State, 371 So. 2d 161 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1979), affid, 386 So. 2d 549 (Fla. 1980).
156. Houser, 474 So. 2d at 1196.
157. 478 So. 2d 1063 (Fla. 1985).
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DWI manslaughter plus another homicide for a single death, such
charges are not permitted, Blockburger and Florida Statute section
775.021(4) notwithstanding.
F. Collateral Estoppel. In Green v. State, 58 the court was faced
with a certified question from the Third District Court of Appeal con-
cerning the defense of collateral estoppel. Green, who was on probation
for robbery, was charged with several crimes. Prior to trial on those
charges, a probation revocation hearing was held. The trial judge at
that hearing determined that the evidence against Green was insuffi-
cient to revoke his probation since the state had not proved the ele-
ments of the charged offenses beyond a reasonable doubt. At his subse-
quent trial on the charges, Green moved to dismiss, arguing that the
state was collaterally estopped from prosecuting him because of the re-
sult of the probation revocation hearing. The motion was denied and
Green was convicted; the district court of appeal upheld the convic-
tion, 9 but certified the collateral estoppel question to the supreme
court as one of great public importance.6 0
The supreme court, in a five to two decision, affirmed the district
court of appeal, thus upholding Green's conviction. Rather than ad-
dressing the case in collateral estoppel terms, the court broadened its
discussion to the issue of double jeopardy. The court reasoned that
since the probation revocation hearing was only to determine if Green's
probation for a prior offense had been violated, it was a deferred sen-
tencing proceeding, citing as authority two earlier opinions by the
court.'8 ' The court went on to say that Green had not been subjected to
conviction or punishment for his new criminal activities during the pro-
bation revocation hearing, so there was no double jeopardy bar to his
subsequent prosecution for those activities. As an analogy, the court
noted that a defendant properly may be prosecuted even though there
is a finding of no probable cause at a preliminary hearing. 6
Justice McDonald dissented in an opinion in which Justice Adkins
158. 463 So. 2d 1139 (Fla. 1985).
159. Green v. State, 450 So. 2d 509 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
160. Id. at 509: "When in a probation revocation proceeding, a trial judge finds
that the evidence is insufficient to prove the criminal offense asserted as the ground for
revocation, is the state collaterally estopped from trying the defendant for the same
criminal offense?"
161. Green, 463 So. 2d at 1140, citing State v. Payne, 404 So. 2d 1055 (Fla.
1981), and Delaney v. State, 190 So. 2d 578 (Fla. 1966).
162. Green, 463 So. 2d at 1140, citing State v. Hernandez, 217 So. 2d 109 (Fla.
1968).
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concurred. Stating that collateral estoppel and double jeopardy are
"distinct legal concepts," Justice McDonald argued that the former
concept could be disposed of merely by finding that jeopardy did not
attach during the probation revocation hearing. He cited the United
States Supreme Court's definition and rule regarding collateral estop-
pel: "When an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by a
valid and final judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated between
the same parties in a future law suit."163 Since the issue litigated in the
criminal trial was exactly the same as that litigated in the earlier pro-
bation revocation hearing, during which the trial judge sitting as trier
of fact found Green not guilty, the dissent argued that collateral estop-
pel should have prevented the subsequent trial.164
It appears that the dissent had a better grasp of the law and the
distinction between double jeopardy and collateral estoppel. However,
had the court adopted the position of the defense, the practical applica-
tion of the rule would have created an extremely burdensome and risky
situation for the state when attempting to revoke a defendant's proba-
tion prior to trying him for his latest criminal conduct.
IV. Conclusion
The Florida Supreme Court devoted much of its work during 1985
toward clarifying the law regarding lesser included and multiple of-
fenses. It is apparent from a close reading of the court's opinions, how-
ever, that the law in this complicated area is still far from being clear
and will continue to occupy much of the court's time in future years.
Even while concurring, Justice Shaw, in two important decisions, 6 5 has
expressed serious concern regarding the underlying and fundamental
reasoning of the court in this area.
Most of the decisions during 1985 regarding substantive criminal
offenses and defenses were of a limited or narrow reach. However, in
the important area of entrapment the court took a giant step and spoke
with unusual clarity. In adding the threshold objective test, to be ap-
plied by the judge, to the "predisposition test" applied by the jury, the
court departed from the federal (and majority) rule, and adopted a dis-
163. Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970).
164. Green, 463 So. 2d at 1140 (McDonald, J., dissenting).
165. State v. Enmund, 476 So. 2d 165 (Fla. 1985), and Green v. State, 475 So.
2d 235 (Fla. 1985).
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tinctive minority position. This appears to be one area where the law
should be stabilized for the foreseeable future.
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